Patent Buyouts

Recently I had a conversation with a reader/supporter of the blog. One of the things we talked about was a great 1998 paper, “Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation.” by Michael Kremer, who won the Nobel Prize in economics in 2019, together with Esther Duflo and Abhijit Banerjee.

Like the policy I wrote about in an earlier post, this is another clear example of low-hanging policy fruit. If implemented well, it has the potential to speed up the rate of innovation and progress.

Short summary

  • Patents were originally created to incentivise innovation. However, they also have a lot of downside implications that may deter innovation:

    – They don’t always provide the best incentives for original research because inventors cannot fully capture the consumer surplus available in the market.
    – Inventors don’t receive the benefits from spillovers to other new ideas.
    – Patents lead to distortions in the areas in which companies innovate. This is because it may not make economic sense to research areas where a lot of patents exist already.
    – Firms may engage in wasteful spending on things like the reverse-engineering of competitors’ patents.
    Thus, the problems associated with patents may hinder innovation and progress (section 1 describes these drawbacks in more detail).
  • Kremer suggests a new mechanism, the ‘patent buyout’. The government steps in and buys patents, which are then freely distributed to the public, who can enjoy the benefits associated with the patent. Additionally, companies are now free to make improvements upon the original patent because they are no longer constrained by having to negotiate with the original patent holder to get rights/access to it (go straight to section 2 if interested in a description of the patent buyout mechanism).
  • Section 3 discusses the patent buyout in action, briefly describing Daguerreotype photography process.
  1. What are the problems with patents?

In the absence of a patent system, the incentives for research would be substantially lower because anything a firm creates could be appropriated by its competitors. Fear of this happening, and the lower financial remuneration associated with this, reduces the incentives for original research. Thus, to prevent this from occurring, patents bestow a temporary monopoly (approximately 20 years) to a firm that has a new idea. This enables the patent-holder to profit from the new idea, increasing the incentive to innovate.

However, patents can also stifle innovation. In the last five or so years, we have seen a proliferation of 3D printers. They now have more commercial applications but also 3D printing is now affordable to a lay-person who finds 3D printing interesting.

However, this could have happened much earlier. Innovation was stifled due to the patents that restricted other companies from entering the market. Once these patents expired, the bottleneck was removed. Prices of 3D printers plummeted because of new entrants into the market. Additionally, these new companies improved upon the existing technology, making the products better. The patent buyout mechanism (described in the next section) could have brought forward this this surge of innovation.

In an 1851 editorial, The Economist wrote that granting patents, “inflames cupidity, excites fraud, stimulates men to run after schemes that may enable them to levy a tax on the public, begets disputes and quarrels betwixt inventors, provokes endless lawsuits, bestows rewards on the wrong persons, makes men ruin themselves for the sake of getting the privilege of a patent.” This is perhaps an exaggeration but there are indeed a number of problems with patents:

  1. Some consumers cannot access the good/service because the product that is patented is charged at the monopoly price. This means that some consumers can’t benefit from the product, despite willing to pay above the cost price of production (but not at the monopoly price). For example, AZT (azidothymidine) is a drug used to prevent mother-to-child spread of HIV/AIDS during birth. There are potentially millions of cases of mother-to-child infection in developing countries, where individuals/governments/NGOs may have been prepared to pay above the cost price of the drug but not the monopoly price.
  2. Patents don’t allow the patent-holder to capture a large amount of the consumer surplus that their idea generates, which leads to lower incentives for original research. For example, Michael Milken (founder of Prostate Cancer Foundation) would presumably pay hundreds of millions of dollars for a drug that was effective in tackling prostate cancer but pharmaceutical companies don’t take this into account since they would not be able to extract this value from Milken.
  3. The empirical evidence suggests that new research usually creates positive externalities for other research. However, patents don’t reward innovators for these positive spillovers. Without taking these externalities into account, patents lead to lower incentives for original research.
  1. Patents may distort the direction of research from firms because firms are incentivised to work on areas where there are less patents restricting their innovation, rather than areas where patents already exist. Kremer explains that this has happened in the past:

    “For example, the development of the high pressure steam engine was blocked by Watt’s patent covering all steam engines; Watt’s steam engine was blocked by a previous patent until he found a way to invent around it; and Edison’s improved version of the telegraph was blocked by Bell’s prior patent for many years [Mokyr, 1990].” (I may write a post on this!).
  2. Finally, patents also lead to wasteful spending because firms waste resources reverse engineering patents. 

2. Patent buyouts

Kremer’s idea is simple. The government steps in, buys the patent, and destroys it. Now anyone (consumers or firms) can access it and build upon it.

However, we need to know how much the government has to pay for the price of that patent. Kremer suggests a mechanism that is used to determine the price the government pays.

First, patents are submitted by entrepreneurs to an auction. Then firms bid on this auction, revealing their valuation of the patent. Once the bidding is complete, the government offers to buy the patents at the winning price plus a markup. I won’t talk about how exactly to determine this markup (it should be the difference between the social and private value of inventions), but for now let’s say the mark-up is 10%. Thus, in our example, the government would pay the price determined by the auction plus a 10% premium. Once this process is complete, entrepreneurs owning the patent get to choose whether to accept or reject the governments offer. If the offer is too low, entrepreneurs maintain the right to reject the deal.

Couldn’t firms simply bid extremely high prices? How do we incentivise firms to give truthful valuations of their bids? To avoid this, the government randomly selects some bids that would be sold to the next highest bidder. So, let’s say 20% of the patents are sold to the next highest bidder. The other 80% of patents would be bought by the government and made available to the public. Thus, if a firm goes wild and bids extremely high prices, they would have to pay above market price for their poor bidding strategy. So, firms are incentivised to reveal their true valuations of the patents, otherwise they’ll be punished financially.

Figure 1 demonstrates the process visually. Patents are submitted to begin the procedure. The price of the patents are determined by the auction. The government then offers the price determined at auction plus an additional markup. If the patent holder accepts, the government randomises across buying the patent and releasing it to the public, or it is sold to the next highest bidder.

This mechanism isn’t calling for a complete abolition of the patent system. Indeed within this system, the patents not bought by governments are sold to firms. Thus, patent buyouts act in parallel with the existing system, rather than completely overhauling it.

The biggest difficulty with the mechanism (as Kremer acknowledges in the paper) is that it can be plagued by incompetent or corrupt government officials. Kremer suggests ways of overcoming these problems. For example, rather than the government matching the highest price (plus a premium) in the auction, they would instead select the third highest bid. This lowers the chances of the government having to pay for overzealous bids (also known as the winner’s curse). Additionally, if firms tried to collude to get higher prices, it would have to be three firms that collude, making collusion more difficult.

Finally, another problem lies with the fact that the government has to select the right patents. The government could pick patents to buyout that do not benefit society much.

Similarly, imagine there are two products, A and B. Let’s say product A is superior to product B, but the government chooses to buy the patent of product B. This means that the government could flood the market with an inferior product.

3. The Daguerreotype process of photography: A historical example

In 1837, Louis Daguerre invented the daguerreotype process of photography. The video below shows how it works.

How was it made? The Daguerreotype process of photography.

Daguerre was struggling to sell his new invention. Fortunately for him, Francois Arago, a politician and member of the Academie des Sciences argued “that the government should compensate M. Daguerre direct, and that France should then nobly give to the whole world this discovery which could contribute so much to the progress of art and science.” (quoted in Kremer).

In 1839, the French government bought the invention from Daguerre and put the process into the public domain. After this patent buyout, Daguerreotype photography spread across other countries and was subject to a number of improvements. Furthermore, the technique had spillover effects into improving innovation in chemistry and the production of lenses.

4. Conclusion

This is one of my favourite papers. Consumers gain through access to new innovation, innovators gain because they are paid a premium to their patents, and governments gain by improving the welfare of their citizens. Kremer suggests it could be experimented with on a smaller scale at first, and if successful, gradually expand its application. I hope it is experimented with in the future.

In a later post, I will address another paper in a later post, ‘Advance Market Commitments‘, which is something Kremer also pioneered. 

Finally, some may find this interesting. The word patent originates from the Latin word ‘patere‘, which ironically means, ‘to lay open’.

I’m on Twitter @krisgulati, where I tweet about the causes and consequences of progress, economic growth, technological change, and innovation. I have made a Progress Studies subreddit to foster discussion. You can follow my work on the Progress Studies LinkedIn page or the Progress Studies Facebook page.

If you like this blog and want to see more posts on Progress Studies you can support me (regularly) on Patreon or for one-off donations visit Buy me a Coffee.

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Progress Studies Assorted Links 2

  1. Tony Blair and Chris Yiu write on the need for progress.

  2. “The Baker Hypothesis” a new (NBER) economics working paper by Chari, Henry, and Reyes. They find that in emerging and developing economies, the average rate of real GDP growth is higher after countries adopt ‘free-market policies’ such as: inflation stabilisation, trade liberalisation, greater openness to foreign investment, and (possibly) more privatisation of industries.

  3. A collection of talks and articles by Peter Thiel on progress and stagnation. This is actually from last month but I think it’s pretty interesting and thought to put it in this time.

  4. 80,000 hours released a new article on “how to use your career to help reduce existential risk”.

  5. “Why haven’t we celebrated any major achievements lately?” by Jason Crawford. “In reading stories of progress, one thing that has struck me was the wild, enthusiastic celebrations that accompanied some of them in the past… somehow it’s hard for me to imagine similar jubilation happening today”

  6. When can fiction change the world? by Timothy Underwood. “As part of this I did some thinking about when fiction seemed to exert an influence on public policy, and then I looked for academic research on the subject, and I think there are people… who will find this write up about the subject interesting and useful.”

    There have also been a few podcasts over the last couple of weeks.

  7. Village Global’s Venture Stories podcast with Jason Crawford. They discuss: “the key aspects of human progress; the history of progress over time; whether we’ve traded off progress for safety; why the idea of progress is relatively new; what the nature of science fiction writing tells us about our vision for progress; why progress happens differently in different domains; how to think about safety with respect to new technologies; the impacts of slowing population growth.”

  8. Jason Crawford appears on the AEI podcast with James Pethokoukis. They “discuss the history of technological and moral progress. And they explore how policymakers can promote further innovation and development in the future.”

  9. The Torch of Progress podcast episode 10 with Dr Laura Mazer. They talk about the past and future of progress in surgery.

  10. The Conservative Curious podcast with Dr Anton Howes. “We discuss the improving mentality, what we can learn from Britain’s 300-year period of technological advancement, why innovators should also be cultural entrepreneurs and how paranoia can spark innovation.”

If you think I’ve missed something, please let me know.

I’m on Twitter @krisgulati, where I tweet about the causes and consequences of progress, economic growth, technological change, and innovation. I have made a Progress Studies subreddit to foster discussion. You can follow my work on the Progress Studies LinkedIn page or the Progress Studies Facebook page.

If you like this blog and want to see more posts on Progress Studies you can support me (regularly) on Patreon or for one-off donations visit Buy me a Coffee.

You can subscribe here

Progress Studies Assorted Links 1

I plan to send out a list of assorted links, which will signpost interesting things that I have come across recently that relate to Progress Studies.

Also, quick update before the links. I’m writing a post on how AI may impact the labour market. This will be out in the next ten days (I’m in the process of moving).

  1. Tyler Cowen interviews Nicholas Bloom about Management, Productivity, and Scientific Progress (Podcast). 

    “He joined Tyler for a conversation about which areas of science are making progress, the factors that have made research more expensive, why government should invest more in R&D, how lean management transformed manufacturing, how India’s congested legal system inhibits economic development, the effects of technology on Scottish football hooliganism, why firms thrive in China, how weak legal systems incentivize nepotism, why he’s not worried about the effects of remote work on American productivity (in the short-term), the drawbacks of elite graduate programs, how his first “academic love” shapes his work today, the benefits of working with co-authors, why he prefers periodicals and podcasts to reading books, and more.”
  1. “Why accelerating economic growth and innovation is not important in the long run” Effective Altruism Forum.

    Sam Hughes (Centre for Global Development) and I are working on a few posts together. One of these is a post on taxonomising criticisms of Progress and Progress Studies. This forum post falls under one of the categories we’re writing about, that being critiques of Progress/growth due to existential risk/unintended outcomes.
  1. “The Silicon and Industrial Revolution” by Dietrich Vollrath.

    Vollrath explains “the underlying idea in growth economics that it is innovations and invention that drive growth in the long run. But the similarity of the Silicon Valley experience to how Mokyr describes the Industrial Revolution experience does suggest that this innovation and invention is less a function of economy-wide aggregate features (e.g. demographics, trade) and more on niche groups of innovators embedded in specific places and cultures.”

    Then Vollrath suggests, “You could also file this as an example of the idea that it is better to concentrate your investment and R&D (and education?) rather than making it broad-based.” hat tip Matt Clancy

  2. An interesting (twitter) thread by Dr Anton Howes.

    He suggests that Sebastian Cabot (1474-1557), could be a “possible candidate for [the] most influential person in England in mid-16th century”. Cabot could be responsible for introducing patents, using these to bring in investment to form joint stock companies, and also led a number of foreign expeditions. Anton said he would be writing this up and I’m looking forward to reading that.
  3. We’ve set up a Virtual Progress Studies reading group.

    At the moment it’s hard to get a time that suits everyone because people are from different parts of the world. If we fail to converge on a time zone that enables a significant number of people participating, I was thinking of resorting to do it via a Forum.

  4. The Future of Humanity Institute, based in The University of Oxford, has opened up its two-year Research Scholars Programme. It has a reasonable amount of overlap with Progress Studies, so I thought that this may intrigue some readers.

  5. The New York Times has put out a job advert: it states, the person they are looking for “will investigate global and national challenges through the lens of progress, or the obstacles to progress.”

  6. There will be a Progress Studies Study Group (with an amazing line-up!), hosted by Jason Crawford. I should say it’s $2,400, and $1,200 for students (although even with the discount, it’s out of my budget sadly).

  7. Would Richard Feynman be able to get tenure in 2020? (question on Quora).

I’m on Twitter @krisgulati, where I tweet about the causes and consequences of progress, economic growth, technological change, and innovation. I have made a Progress Studies subreddit to foster discussion. You can follow my work on the Progress Studies LinkedIn page or the Progress Studies Facebook page.

If you like this blog and want to see more posts on Progress Studies you can support me (regularly) on Patreon or for one-off donations visit Buy me a Coffee.

You can subscribe here

Online Progress Studies Reading Group

I’ve recently began to organise a virtual Progress Studies reading group. We’re still in the early stages of launching it (organising the reading agenda and a time that suits everyone). Everyone is welcome to attend. A few details:

The format we’re going for is that one person every week is selected to summarise the designated reading and present that summary to the rest of the group. We then proceed to discuss that topic.

If you would like to join, we’re organising/communicating via the Progress Studies Slack channel. We’re still in the process of setting the agenda for what to read, so feel free to join and suggest things you find interesting (this can be journals, blogs, books, podcasts, etc.). So far we have approximately 5-10 people interested, including Jason Crawford (Roots of Progress) and Sam Hughes (Centre for Global Development).

I’m on Twitter @krisgulati, where I tweet about the causes and consequences of progress, economic growth, technological change, and innovation. I have made a Progress Studies subreddit to foster discussion. You can follow my work on the Progress Studies LinkedIn page or the Progress Studies Facebook page.

If you like this blog and want to see more posts on Progress Studies you can support me (regularly) on Patreon or for one-off donations visit Buy me a Coffee.

You can subscribe here

Could the knowledge frontier advance faster?

I’m beginning my journey into Progress Studies by summarising and synthesising some of the literature scattered around.

Here, I show an example of the potential power of Progress Studies. The policy implications of the paper I summarise in this post demonstrate the low-hanging fruit available to the field. If we were to implement the policy prescriptions of the paper below, we could improve the rate of scientific knowledge being created.

Short summary

I summarise “Invisible Geniuses: Could the Knowledge Frontier Advance Faster?” by Ruchir Agarwal and Patrick Gaule (the actual paper is unusually short, concise, and readable for an Economics publication). For an ungated link see here

  • The paper attempts to better understand the determinants of idea/knowledge production.
  • There are two key findings:
  • Firstly, individuals who are ‘talented’ as teenagers (proxied by International Mathematical Olympiad [IMO] score, a popular international Maths competition) are very capable of advancing the knowledge frontier later in life. On average, the higher the IMO score, the more likely a participant is to: obtain a Maths PhD, obtain a Maths PhD from a top 10 research school, publish more in academic journals, receive more citations, receive notable accolades such as the Fields Medal, or be a speaker at the International Congress of Mathematicians (ICM).
  • Secondly, if these capable individuals were born in poorer countries, they are much less likely to contribute to the knowledge frontier than individuals born in wealthier countries. For example, on average IMO participants from low-income countries produce 34% fewer publications and receive 56% fewer citations than IMO participants from richer countries with the same IMO score.
  • The findings suggest that one way of developing the knowledge frontier faster is by creating policies to target these low-income students in order to support them in their academic careers. By doing so, we could improve the rate of scientific progress.

I’ll now proceed to write a slightly longer summary of the paper. The structure will stay largely similar to the original paper i.e. follows the same order, but with less detail and excludes the regressions.

Key questions the paper investigates

  1. How much does talent displayed in teenage years affect the amount of knowledge produced later in life?
  2. Conditional on a given level of talent in teenage years (IMO score), how much does the country of birth influence the quantity of knowledge produced later in life? 


The International Mathematical Olympiad (IMO) is a prestigious mathematical competition held annually since 1959. Individuals from across the world represent their countries and compete to win bronze, silver, and gold medals. Participants confront six questions with different levels of difficulty. Each problem is worth a maximum of seven points and the highest possible score is 42 points. The authors collect data on 4710 IMO participants from 1981-2000. This data contained the year of participant, country of origin, points scored, and type of medal achieved.

The authors also collected data on the long-term outcomes in mathematics for these individuals. To collect data on PhD theses, they used the Mathematics Genealogy Project. This project aims “to compile information on all mathematicians in the world.” This source had information on: the name of the student, the university they attended, the name of the advisor, graduation year, and dissertation topic. 

The authors used MathSciNet to collect bibliometric data. This source has information on the total publications and citations broken down by author. 

Agarwal and Gaule also collected data on particularly notable/prestigious awards in Mathematics. These were IMO participants who later became speakers at the International Congress of Mathematicians (ICM) or won Fields medals. 

Finally, data was collected on the employment of the IMO medalists (2272 of the 4710 participants won medals), to see if they were employed in mathematics academia, outside of mathematics but in academia, in industry, or didn’t have an online profile. 

1. How does talent (proxied by IMO score) as a teenager relate to later research success?

Figure 1 (below) plots various mathematical achievements (y-axis) against the number of points scored on the IMO (x-axis). 

The first four graphs (three on the top row and one on the bottom-left) show a clear positive relationship between points scored at the IMO and subsequent mathematical success. Thus,  on average the more points a participant scores at the IMO, the more likely they are to get a Math PhD, a Math PhD from a top 10 school, more publications (in logs), and more citations (in logs). The other two graphs show the relationship between points scored and exceptional Mathematical achievements later during their research careers (Fields Medal and ICM speakers). These show a positive but weaker relationship than the other graphs. 

The authors then regress points scored at the IMO (dependent variable) and subsequent achievement (the six outcomes in Figure 1), whilst controlling for cohort, and country of origin. The regression (see paper) suggests that for each additional point scored at the IMO, there is on average:

  • 1 percentage point increase in the likelihood of obtaining a PhD
  • 2.6% increase in publications
  • 4.3% increase in citations
  • 0.1 percentage point increase in the likelihood of becoming an ICM speaker
  • 0.03 percentage point increase in the likelihood of becoming a Fields medalist

Additionally, they find that if individuals score more points in the more difficult problems, then this is more predictive of future mathematical achievements than scoring points in the ‘easier’ problems. 

Agarwal and Gaule then compare IMO medalists to mathematicians who didn’t participate in the IMO. They constructed a sample of all PhD students obtaining a PhD in Maths, and a subsample of PhD students from top 10 schools. They compared these samples against the accomplishments of bronze, silver, and gold IMO medalists who have a PhD. 

Figure 2 (below) shows that for each outcome, the medalists (particularly the gold medalists) outperform PhD students and PhD students from top 10 schools, who did not participate in the IMO. Medalists consistently get more publications, citations, go on to become speakers at the ICM, and receive Fields medals during their careers. 

In fact, the probability of receiving a Fields medal is fifty times larger for IMO gold medalists than the corresponding probability for a PhD graduate from a top 10 mathematics programme.

2. Conditional on a given level of talent in teenage years (IMO score), how much does the country of birth influence the quantity of knowledge produced later in life? 

For the purpose of statistical analysis, the participants are grouped in terms of their countries income level (high income, upper middle-income, lower middle-income, and low-income). This grouping is a proxy for differences in opportunities and environment. The authors emphasise, “while our regressions explicitly control for IMO scores, it is worth noting that participants from developing countries do not score lower at the IMO than participants from developed countries.”

Figure 3 shows points scored at the IMO in five-point intervals (x-axis) against the share of PhD students receiving a PhD in Maths (y-axis).  

Largely we can see that for each number of points scored at the IMO, the high-income countries (black) obtain the most Maths PhDs, followed by upper-middle (green), then lower-middle (grey), and finally low-income countries (blue), who received the least amount of Maths PhDs. 

The authors then conduct another regression. This time the dependent variables are successful outcomes: PhD in Maths, PhD in Maths from a top school, publications (log), and citations (log). The main independent variable here is the income group of participants alongside control variables, and importantly the number of IMO points scored. Thus, we’re controlling for ‘talent’ and investigating the effect of the country’s income on future successes in Mathematics. 

For the sake of brevity I have left the regression table out. The results of the regression suggest that participants from low and middle-income countries have less research accomplishments in their later careers than those individuals from richer countries with the same IMO score:

“IMO participants from low-income countries are 16 percentage points less likely to do a PhD and 3.2 percentage points less likely to do a PhD in a top school; they produce 34% fewer publications and 56% fewer cites.” 

In fact, IMO participants from low-income countries are approximately half as likely to obtain a PhD from a top-tier school than their rich country participants with the same IMO score. This effect holds true of participants from middle-income countries, albeit with a smaller effect size. The IMO participants from low and lower-middle income countries are not more likely to be employed in non-mathematics academic positions, or in industry jobs. 

The authors suggest that if IMO participants from low-income countries were producing knowledge at the same rate as those from high-income countries, then they would produce approximately 10% more publications, and 17% more citations.

Conclusion and policy recommendations

Firstly, the paper finds a clear link between ‘talent’ as measured by IMO score, and future research success. Secondly, the paper finds that conditional on a given level of talent, IMO participants from lower-income countries contribute to the research frontier substantially less than richer country participants. That is, despite achieving the same IMO scores, they contribute significantly less research later on in their careers.

Although this paper focused on Maths (the dataset was a really innovative way to overcome many empirical challenges), the same arguments could be applied to other fields. A particularly poignant point is that in Maths, people who have the highest levels of talent as teenagers (gold medalists) are for more likely to do significantly better across a variety of metrics designed to measure successful research compared to other individuals. This talent is rare. Losing this talent seems to suggest a significant waste in terms of scientific progress that could have been made otherwise. The authors suggest that “many geniuses from poor countries are never discovered or given the chance to excel as teenagers in the first place.”

There are a number of policies that could be administered in order to support the individuals from lower-income countries. Firstly, we could give scholarships/fellowships to these students in order to alleviate their financial concerns and support their development. Secondly, elite schools could encourage applications from talented individuals in developing countries. For example, MIT reaches out to international communities of talented individuals and provides them financial support if they need it. Finally, it could be possible to improve the training standards at universities in developing countries to nurture the talented individuals who don’t want to leave their country of birth. 


  • I left out a number of caveats the authors raise. For example, there are potential competing explanations for the results.
  • A couple ideas for future research, perhaps:
  • Firstly, we have the results for the Math Olympiad. Can we generalise the results to other subjects? One way of doing so would be to look at the other (less well known) international competitions, such as the Physics Olympiad etc.
  • Secondly, this makes a clear case for international comparisons. I wonder how things operate at a within-country level? I.e. are there any similar set-ups, where we could exploit the use of domestic national competitions for example.
  • Thirdly, let’s say that it’s hard to obtain (expensive) financial scholarships for students from developing countries to top tier universities such as MIT/Harvard. One alternative solution may be to match students from developing countries with famous Professors from developed countries. Maths research is often an individual pursuit. So it may be possible to emulate the academic environment that leads to later Maths success, by providing access to mentors or access to online classes at top-tier universities.
  • It may be able to ‘sell’ this policy to companies/rich individuals. If we have mechanisms enabling us to identify talented individuals from an early age, a company could profit from a smartly administered income-sharing agreement.

Sam Altman recently had an interesting twitter thread that relates to theme of tapping into under-utilised potential:

I’m on Twitter @krisgulati, where I tweet about the causes and consequences of progress, economic growth, technological change, and innovation. I have made a Progress Studies subreddit to foster discussion. You can follow my work on the Progress Studies LinkedIn page or the Progress Studies Facebook page.

If you like this blog and want to see more posts on Progress Studies you can support me (regularly) on Patreon or for one-off donations visit Buy me a Coffee.

You can subscribe here